Security culture goes far beyond putting your cellphone in the microwave during your meetings. It is about making sure your collective is safe, secure, and fully supported. With the increased criminalisation of ideological groups such as ANTIFA and P*lestine Action it is more important than ever that we are keeping each other safe.

Security is referred to as culture because it goes far beyond what happens in your meetings and actions to how you behave in everyday life. Security practices should be habitual within your collective and the wider Leftist spaces. They also vary between collectives depending on the different risks and needs of the collective and should be explicitly discussed with the collective and explained with any new comers.

Creating a security culture in your collective is never a one time thing; it takes regular practice, discussion, and adapting to changing risks and technologies. Good security culture should build courage and not fear in our communities because we know that we already have multiple layers of protection in place so that we can be dangerous together.

In one workshop I attended, security culture was described as layers of Swiss cheese. Every layer of security used is imperfect and has holes, but the more layers we add, the less likely the holes will all match up to let information through. It is also about making the c*ps jobs as difficult as possible.

This is a general chat about implementing security culture in all leftist collectives. For digital security see my previous blog, and information on action security is in process.

Basics

• Don’t talk to c*ps, even about the weather, c*ps have one job and that is to gather information. Keeping silent when someone is “just trying to have a conversation with you” can be difficult but it is the best tool you have against to protect yourself and your friends.
• Educate yourselves on the current laws in your region and what breaking them might mean for different people in your collective. We do not all carry the same risk!
• Decide on your security culture together as a collective and make sure that when new people join they are aware of your security culture. This is also a good opportunity for a whole collective refresher.
• Call people in on their mistakes. We all make mistakes and it is really important that we do not shame each other for them. Remind them about the security culture the collective has agreed to practice.
• Don’t discuss Actions in public places! Use code words, like someone’s birthday trip if you need to plan in public.
• Keep information on a need to know basis: If there are parts of the action that don’t include everyone in the collective, do they need to know? Does telling everyone the target before you have assembled for the action make sense?
• Don’t ask don’t tell, ignorance is the best tool against speaking to c*ps. If you ask, remember nobody owes you an answer and their refusal to answer is as much about keeping you safe as it is for themselves.
• Don’t tell your family and friends the details of where you are going, but make sure there is someone you trust who knows when to start looking for you if you don’t make it back.
• To take photos, don’t be photographed, don’t post photos online
• Get used to using Cybersecurity during your daily life.

What level of security culture is needed for your collective?

Risk model

As a collective, it is important to discuss your personal and collective risk model, so that you can decide together what layers of security are needed. Knowing your risks and what you are going to do to mitigate them can help build courage and avoid falling into a risk-adverse mindset and self-police ourselves out of taking any actions at all.

Actions all have different risks depending on the current legal situation in the country you are in and the type of action you are taking. There are also personal risk factors, such as if you are a member of a targeted group and/or have a precarious immigration/visa status, your occupation, your income, if you have dependents. Group factors depends on your collectives participation, whether you are the organisers or participating in black block, or if you are locked-on or on the side supporting.

Remember, arrests are not the only form of repression. We also face threats from fascists who would dox, harass, or beat us, our bosses and landlords could potentially take our homes and incomes, family courts may take away our children, our visas could be revoked, and undercovers may try to entrap us or sow seeds of conflict that break up the collective. Worse, Antifa (i.e. the left) in America have been threatened with execution.

“Other under-covers changed passwords on websites and email addresses, directed buses to the wrong locations, stole medical supplies, spread harmful rumours to aggravate social conflict, and even attempted to entrap youth in a weird bomb plot. All of these c*ps actions were immensely disruptive, without ever needing to rely on the power of the courts, and we will probably never have a full picture of their impact.” itsgoingdown.org/confidence-courage-robust-security/

Again this is not to scare you and definitely not to stop you but to help you be prepared to mitigate these risks together.

Some examples of risk might be:

Publicly announced demonstration – low risk to medium risk

Human Blockade, with possible arrests: low – medium risk depending on the type of Action and Legal situation.

Tactical Blockade, with arrests – Medium to high risk

Property destruction: High risk

Trespassing: Medium to High risk

Occupation: Medium to High risk

The level of security culture required depends on your collectives risk. If you are going to be participating in low to medium risk Actions then it doesn’t make sense for you to have a very stringent security culture that isolates your collective and creates paranoia.

Open vs Closed group organising

Security culture often comes with feelings of mistrust; it is easy to become paranoid and to shut out any new people as potential undercovers or informers. This doesn’t have to be the case. We need collectives that have different risk models and closed and open organising structures so that we continue to have spaces where new people can come and get involved and build trust. Otherwise we let the c*ps/fash win as we drive ourselves to extinction through burnout.

As one anonymous contributor to the anarchist library wrote, “Repression functions by isolating people. I don’t want to contribute to isolation through the things I do to keep myself and my friends safe. I want a security culture rooted in deepening our connection with each other. When we don’t transform isolation, organising can feel no different than work and we don’t build the kinds of relationships that truly transform us, such that we can begin to feel the world we wish to create.” theanarchistlibrary.org/library/anonymous-confidence-courage-connection-trust

If, as a wider community, we can continue building the future that we want with a mix of open and closed organising models, we can continue to grow the movement through connection.

Models

An open assembly is publicly announced and is important for inviting new people into the movement. These can be used for mass actions and demonstrations where numbers are key to keeping everyone safe. History shows us that we cannot trust everyone in the room at open assemblies, so we should always be cautious with what information we share. However, these are still really useful spaces for meeting new people and play an important part in any movement.

Partially open groups are shared by word of mouth to trusted people. This hopefully does some of the vetting for you by encouraging comrades to only share with the people that they trust already. It is a way to hopefully get new people involved and keep all but the deepest undercovers out. Hopefully, it is a place you can meet people to create smaller, closed affinity groups with. It is not foolproof and should still be treated with caution while hopefully not letting suspicion destroy us from the inside.

If you are going to take part in criminalised civil disobedience it is best to have a closed affinity group with an ingrained culture for when and how you invite new people to join. It is important that you trust all members of your affinity group implicitly.

Closed affinity groups collaborating inside an open or partially open model. You can protect your organisers in closed affinity groups of trusted comrades. Information is then shared on a need-to-know basis with the larger collective. The identities of the organisers are kept secret to protect them from the higher repression they face. This model is typically used at camps or mass actions. It is effective but has the downside of not being able to drawn on the knowledge and experience of others attending until after the action at the debrief, and also gives the organisers power over the collective by taking away the capacity for shared decision making.

All of these models should and do exists together, often overlapping as we share and enjoy spaces together.

Knowledge is power

Restricting knowledges within collective s is a common tactic for maintaining the anonymity of the action organisers; however, this inevitably creates a power imbalance as to who has access to that knowledge and who is excluded. It creates a clear distinction between in-groups and outsiders and can make life feel like we are back in high school again, triggering some to play games in an attempt to gain social capital in order to join the in-group, creating dangerous dynamics in the collective. As much as we would like to think that we are all more mature now, the reality is that we were all probably those tormented misfits once.

Likewise, the people with the information are those taking actions who are generally held in higher esteem in collectives and may get more speaking time in meetings as they discuss the actions. Thus affording them more social capital than those who are unable to actively participate.

If your collective is anarchist, this also creates a moral dilemma, as Scrappy Capy Distro writes in the Anarchist Library, “Being able to restrict knowledge and resources is power, and when phrased that way, it becomes immediately obvious that security culture is—in some ways—at odds with autonomy. Controlling the flow of information to hinder intelligence gathering inherently is wielding power over one’s current and would-be comrades. Controlling the access to resources—physical spaces, equipment, use of a platform—is again wielding power. These both restrict others’ autonomy, even if security culture increases everyone’s autonomy in other ways, such as by enabling action or preventing imprisonment. Knowledge gives us more choices and therefore more autonomy.” theanarchistlibrary.org/library/scrappy-capy-distro-security-without-hierarchy

I do not have any straight forward answers that will make this power imbalance disappear; rather, like with all power imbalances in your collective, I recommanded first acknowledging it and discussing in your collective how you are going to address this.

Names/Identity

It is common to use fake names at camps and during actions. This way, someone can shout your fake name, and it doesn’t matter who is listening. If no one knows your real name or details about you then they can’t give it to the c*ps. In activist collectives, it is common to have a regular fake name that you use all the time with your friends and comrades, as well as making up a different fake name (that is not used again) for actions. The name that you use should be realistic and easy to distinguish when it is shouted in a crowd. These names should not be connected with your online names.

Different countries have different laws around if you are required to identify yourself to the c*ps, but even if you are required to give your identity no one else can accidentally or intentionally say what your involvement was.

Using fake names and identities is also a thing that undercovers do, so it is important when meeting new people to have a way to be able to verify that you are who you say you are. For closed or semi closed groups; some collectives use vouching, having someone in the collective who knows you or a close mutual friend who can say that you are reliable and that your politics are compatible. There are other methods, such as checking IDs, but this is not suitable for trans or undocumented people. Decide with your collective how you want to make this process work for you.

Conflict resolution

Undercovers are not the only way c*ps can get information from inside your collective. If there is unresolved conflict in your collective or resentment from people being asked to leave the collective these people may be tempted to go to the c*ps with what they know for revenge or it can weaken their sense of attachment and loyalty to the collective during interrogation. Likewise, with people’s interpersonal relationships outside the collective, an angry partner might be tempted to talk.

Security culture can and has been weaponised within collectives with people accusing people they have conflict with as being undercovers or informers.

“We should avoid labeling someone as unsafe or dangerous just because we have perfectly healthy disagreements with them or that they mistakes while learning. Walling people off for perceived or even anticipated differences can be called security, but often it’s just simply exclusion in the name of homogeneity. Some people contrast the approach of creating braver spaces (those that acknowledge that conflicts will exist and promise to work through them) with that of creating safer spaces (those that aim to minimize discomfort). The end goal might be quite similar, but the change in framing can drastically shift the norms and group dynamics.” https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/scrappy-capy-distro-security-without-hierarchy

Having robust conflict resolution and safe(r) spaces practices to help calm internal and external conflict is just as important for security culture as it is for keeping the movement strong and resilient. Likewise if you have good conflict resolution practices in place it will make it less easy for a c*p to sew seeds of conflict within your collective.

Mutual aid

Poverty, housing insecurity, and food insecurity are big barriers to getting involved in the movement and can be a consequence of choosing a life in the movement. Beyond the simple fact that we are not being prefigurative in our organising, if anyone in our collective is left to struggle, it is also a security risk if people are unable to pay legal fees and/or are forced to become a witness for financial gain or ease the financial burden.

Ideas

• Fundraiser for legal fees
• In your collective, share expenses from basics such as travel and phone costs to big things like food and rent using a sliding scale of what people can afford to contribute.
• One-off cash donations to help a comrade who is struggling.
• Go all in and share income with your affinity group. Just like your partners, your affinity group should be your ride or dies. Sharing all or part of your incomes with the group can ensure that you are all in the same shits creek together at least.

“Repression is inevitable, or avoiding it at all costs isn’t worthwhile. Regardless of the struggle, if it’s taken far enough it will become a struggle against the c*ps, those defenders of the world as it is. If we take as a starting point that we will avoid repression at all costs, then we will only use forms of struggle approved of by the c*ps, which makes it pretty much impossible to build collective power capable of transformative change. If we don’t accept these limitations, then we need to be prepared to face repression.“ theanarchistlibrary.org/library/anonymous-confidence-courage-connection-trust

Further reading

“Security Culture: A Handbook for Activists” pdf.resistrnc.org/sectirity.handbook.zine.pdf

“What is Security Culture?” crimethinc.com/2004/ll/01/what-is-security-culture

“Security Culture for Activists” ruckus.org/downloads/RuckusSecurityCultureForActivists.pdf

“Confidence. Courage. Connection. Trust” theanarchistlibrary.org/library/anonymous-confidence-courage-connection-trust

“Security Without Hierarchy” theanarchistlibrary.org/library/scrappy-capy-distro-security-without-hierarchy